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Abstract 
Business opportunities in the European High North (EHN) are accompanied 
by the danger of cyber-threats, especially to critical infrastructures which in 
these Arctic regions become “extra critical” because of the harsh environmental 
climatic conditions and remoteness of distances. Critical infrastructures (CI) 
in the EHN are crucial for numerous sectors, such as the energy sector which 
is completely depended on digitalization, internet and computers’ commands. 
Such a new condition of extra criticality should also include human security 
concerns to avoid human disasters. An effective legal framework under “ex-
ceptionally critically infrastructure conditions” (ECIC) for this technology is 
important not only in terms of national legislation, but also in view of a re-
gional, international and global networks character. This paper links for the 
first time, law, internet and cybersecurity, environment and society in a 
global human security dimension in a multi-regulatory contextual analysis. 
The aim is to trace the legal framework for response to a cyber-attack to 
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critical infrastructure in the energy sector and takes Norway as a case study 
because this country is highly dependent on cyber technology and on critical 
infrastructures. The question of research is: using a human security focus in the 
case of cyber-threats under ECIC in the EHN, what ways can an assessment 
recommend to improve international, and regional law? Five analytical tasks 
are undertaken: 1) the concept of critical infrastructure vulnerability to cy-
ber-attacks under “exceptionally critically infrastructure conditions” (ECIC) in 
the EHN with focus on the energy sector is explained in connection to the 
notion of human security, 2) a backdrop of regional and international col-
laboration is followed, 3) a trajectory of multilevel contextual analysis of the 
different sources of law and policy applicable to cyber-threats to CI is out-
lined, and 4) an examination of cooperation under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  
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1. Introduction 
Economic development opportunities in the European High North1 (EHN) are 
accompanied by the danger of cyber-threats, especially to critical infrastructures 
(CIs) which in the Arctic EHN countries become “extra critical” because of en-
vironmental threats including the harsh environmental climatic conditions and 
the vast distances.2 Such a new condition of extra criticality should also include 
human security concerns to avoid human disasters. Amongst the CIs, the energy 
sector3 is especially relevant in the EHN. This sector is in large part dependent on 
digitalization, the Internet, and demands of computers. Interferences between the 
CI’s digitalization subject to possible cyber-threats with climatic conditions, such 
as ice and natural disasters, will require new methodologies of assessment and 
effective legal frameworks able to protect these CIs against cyber-threats through 
the prism of human security. Thus, human security will become a “virtual hu-
 
 
1The European High Nord (EHN) in this article refers mainly the three Arctic areas of Norway, 
Sweden and Finland. However, it is worth noting that the term EHN has different definitions. The 
term is defined in different ways by different researchers and there is no one single official consoli-
dated definition. See for that point Czarny, R.M., (2015). The High North. Springer International 
Publishing, 2, 7-41. Nevertheless, a precise and established definition of the term would not be rele-
vant in the case of the approach of this article, given that it consider both European law which ap-
plies in all EHN territories (Norway is not a EU member but a party of EEA), and the interactions 
between cybersecurity and climate environmental conditions, a space the latter very difficult to de-
limit since both cyber-threats and climate change effects are trans-regional and trans-boundary and 
do not know any border delimitations. 
2“Environmental threats” in this article refers to the threats of impacts of climate change such as, sea 
level rise (SLR) due to melting glaciers including threats of coastal regions that can affect both the 
environment and humans. Therefore, not only the environment but also infrastructures and people 
who lives in areas difficult to reach becoming remotes and with risks of flooding, are example of en-
vironmental threats that can affect not only the ecology of the areas but also human security. 
3The “energy sector” in this article is defined by four components: oil, gas, electricity and nuclear. 
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man security” that societies will have to face in the future as a new kind of secu-
rity concerns. 
Because cyber-threats can come from anywhere in the word, an examination 
of the CIs under such “exceptionally critically infrastructure conditions” (here-
inafter, the ECIC) requires a comprehensive analysis of the existing sources of 
law and policy at three levels national, regional and international4, to observe 
how the pluralistic systems of legal and political sources could apply and interact 
with complementary legal and non-legal tools. In this article, Norway represents 
the domestic level, the EU represents the regional level, and several selected trea-
ties, the international level. The concept of ECIC is based on the recent existing 
Norwegian criticality definitions, especially those of the recent Norwegian “model 
approach” consisting of a collection of reports, laws and strategies as it will be ex-
plained in Section 3.3. The reason for adoption of the Norwegian model’s ap-
proach is due to the fact that this model takes into account vulnerability, locations 
where CIs are situated in particularly harsh environmental conditions, as it will be 
explained in the case of Svalbard. The Norwegian model also includes a specific 
and inspiring cybersecurity5 response framework. All these mentioned compo-
nents of the Norwegians model are for example lacking in other regional levels, 
such as the EU level or the international level. According to the Norwegian per-
spective, even though it could be argued that the Arctic is much less critical, as 
there is smaller population for instance that can be affected by CIs disruptions, 
there is less redundancy and longer distances in some areas at times cold 
whether that can justify this concept. The consequence could be enormous in 
terms of severity rather than impact number of victims. 
But there are also other justifications supporting the existence of ECIC: firstly 
“cascading effects of CIs”,6 and secondly a general “climatic cascading effect”, 
not linked to cybersecurity and CIs but to the peculiar geographical location of 
the Arctic. The authors of this article advocate that these two types of cascading 
effects act cumulatively and interact. The first cascading effect of CIs explains 
that increasing dependencies among CIs could trigger cascading failures and 
multi-sectorial collapse. This cascading effect belongs to the category of events 
with low probability and high consequence. The potential of domino effect 
seems to be undeniable. Organizations and states’ involvement is not clear and 
 
 
4In this article the term “international law” will be used in an interchangeably way with the term 
“global law” when referring to law other than the regional level of sources of law. This is to differen-
tial “global law” to “regional law”. 
5The term “cybersecurity” in this article commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be 
used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are 
associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cy-
bersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructures and 
the confidentiality of the information contained therein. See the 2013 European Union Strategy, 
European Commission, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace”, 7.2.2013, JOIN (2013) 1 final, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, pp. 1-20. 
6Van Eeten M., et al. (2011). The State and the Threat of Cascading Infrastructures across Critical 
Infrastructures: The Implications of Empirical Evidence from Media Incident Reports. Public Ad-
ministration, 89, 2, 381-400. 
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not easy, and states do not actually know how to deal with these events.7 The 
second type of cascading effect of the CIs defined in this article as “climatic cas-
cading effect of the Arctic” has to be differentiated from the previous “cascading 
effect of CIs”. According to the climatic cascading effect, what happens in the 
Arctic does not stay there, as it is the thermic regulator of the whole planet. If 
there is an oil spill or a nuclear explosion, for example, this will have an enor-
mous repercussion at global level in the rest of the planet. This is enough to jus-
tify the need for extraordinary measures protecting legally and politically, these 
CIs. The impact of this second cascading effect could affect not only the cultural 
heritage of the indigenous rural populations contributing to jeopardise their 
survival and thus leading to humankind extinction, but also the rest of the world 
due to the critical position of the Arctic.  
In the EHN areas, the management of natural resources’ appropriations is 
now increasingly becoming under cyber-control. Outlining the identification of 
a possible regulatory framework for this technology is important, not only in 
terms of national legislation, but also in view of a network at regional, interna-
tional, diplomatic level. An examination of the laws governing cyber-threats to CIs 
under ECIC is also important for practical experts and policy-makers in a position 
to influence decisions in the field of international security, thus, contributing, to 
add a new piece in the puzzle of the concept of human security. This article map 
the legal and political framework protecting critical infrastructures in the EHN 
with Norway as a case study because this country is highly dependent on both 
cyber technology and on critical infrastructures, such as the offshore industries 
for example. In Norway, digitalized offshore activities are very relevant, since this 
country is highly dependent on these kinds of operations, especially on transporta-
tion, aquaculture and fish farming. The article aim to examine whether and which 
areas of international and regional law are applicable to address cyber-attacks in 
the energy sector of the EHN under ECIC conditions. Thus, not only an over-
view of the many global and regional accords operating in different areas of law 
is undertaken, but also domestic mechanisms are considered. In this instance, 
the Norwegian experience provides the case study.  
Hence, the question of research of this article is the following: using a human 
security focus in the case of cyber-threats under ECIC in the EHN, what ways 
can an assessment recommend to improve international and regional law? 
In order to assess the possibility of refitting existing legal and non-legal in-
struments to fill the gap of uncertainties, deficiencies and voids, especially of in-
ternational and regional law, and, most importantly, to address the question of 
research, two main assumptions are formulated. The first assumption is if the 
Norwegian model could represent a legal and policy model to improve the ap-
plicability of international and regional law in designing proactive legal mecha-
nisms achieving human security goals in a pluralistic context. The second as-
 
 
7Van Eeten M., et al. (2011). The State and the Threat of Cascading Infrastructures across Critical 
Infrastructures: The Implications of Empirical Evidence from Media Incident Reports. Public Ad-
ministration, 89, 2, 381-400.  
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sumption is whether the Norwegian model needs to be combined with a plural-
istic and polycentric patchwork of instrument mix and governance, such as 
standards, strategic tools, risk assessment approaches, or a backdrop of coopera-
tion and coordination at the geopolitical level in order to enhance the applicabil-
ity of international and regional law rather than standing in an isolated way. The 
issue of cyber-attacks to critical infrastructures under ECIC conditions in the 
EHN is perceived, on one hand, in a positive way, which means as an opportu-
nity to expand the notion of human security. On the other hand, it could also be 
perceived negatively, as a “disrupter” to Arctic collaboration and coordination. 
Next is the question of, how this coordination could be reconciled with the ac-
tivity of some relevant international organizations, such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In that sense, it is 
important to remember that two of the EHN countries, Finland and Sweden, are 
not part of NATO, and that Norway is not a member of the EU although a Party 
of the European Economic Agreement (EEA) and thus covered by EU legislation 
on cybersecurity. In addition, Russia is taken as an example which is also a 
country located in the Arctic but not in the EHN area, manifests an ambiguous 
position vis-à-vis critical infrastructure in the energy sector. The vulnerability of 
EHN is also an important factor to consider, not only in the field of an interna-
tional law, but also to security in the Arctic. Norway is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, 
and one wonders how this country would react if Russia should sabotage and at-
tack Norwegians’ critical, structural energy assets with the consequence of causing 
a serious oil spill, for example. The energy sector, especially the smart grids, is 
strictly dependent on digitalization, pc organisation and Internet activity. For 
example, in case of cyber’s interferences and threats, these critical infrastructures 
would become “extra-critical” should communications would be totally inter-
rupted. Vessels would be in distress and communications would be jeopardized 
in the harsh environment which would render hard the conduction of rescue 
operations. Currently, at international, EU and nation levels, the law protecting 
CIs looks inhomogeneous and there is a lack of uniformity. There is no regional 
or even global approach from the prism of human security and absence of a 
global treaty. Even though it seems that there could be a theoretical, applicable, 
regulatory framework that could be applied, there is fragmentation. Existing in-
ternational legal frameworks are not directly aimed to cover expressly cy-
ber-attacks but can be used in cyber-attacks. This is also due to the fact that 
these legal regimes were formed prior to the emergence of a cyber-attack and 
therefore not expressly aimed at regulating a cyber-attack appearing to regulate 
only small fraction of cyber-attacks.8 A satisfactory regulatory framework inte-
grating law and policy should look uniform and homogeneous including the 
possibility to govern freedom from risks in order to design a law based on a pre-
cautionary and proactive approach rather than reactive. In terms of governance, 
 
 
8Hathaway, O. A., et al. (2012). The Law of Cyber Attack. Yale Law School, California Law Review, 
817-885. 
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such a framework should not be based on a monistic9 vision of the sources of law 
but rather on a pluralistic and polycentric vision10 where sources of law and pol-
icy in provenance from different areas of law both from the public and private 
sector, overlap and coexist. Law and policy with different policy tools based on 
standards, soft law, and technical expertise, would thus “coexist” in a patchwork 
of instrument mix. Thus, critical infrastructures under ECIC conditions 
represent a crucial empirical opportunity to understand how to strategically de-
sign a patchwork palimpsest composed of a mix of different regulatory pluralis-
tic instruments that will aid policy makers in policy design including freedom 
from hazard. In the light of this pluralistic and polycentric perspective, this ar-
ticle examines the interactions, the pros and cons of different categories of regu-
latory instrument mixes. The study emphasizes that this mix of instruments is 
connected to collateral to both global and non-global governance issues, such as 
environmental climate threats, international relations, the factor of human secu-
rity, private and public approach, standards, all operating in a context of cy-
ber-realpolitik. The regulatory protection of energy infrastructures of the EHN 
countries will be sketched out and discussed not only to identify applicable 
sources of law and policy, but also as tool to refine and expand the notion of 
human security in the pluralistic context. 
This article is structured with the following plan. Firstly, the concept of CIs 
vulnerability to cyber-attacks under the ECIC conditions in the EHN with a fo-
cus on the energy sector is presented (2), and explained in connection with the 
notion of human security (2.1) and the energy sector (2.2). This is because im-
pacts on CIs due to cyber-attacks jeopardize human security shift attention to 
risk assessment and resilience approaches as defined by both civilian and mili-
tary activities. In turn, this contributes to perceiving the concept of human secu-
rity in an untraditional way (not only focusing on states security but also societal 
challenges including environmental threats). This new perception of human se-
curity and risks under ECIC conditions linked to cybersecurity leads to under-
standing what existing responses in regional and international cooperation link-
ing environmental governance and cybersecurity to CIs are, and considering if 
these responses are sufficient to cover risks and cyber-threats in the following 
sections (2.3 and 2.4). For that purpose, the link between cybersecurity under 
ECIC conditions and the activity of an international organization dealing with 
such link, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is taken as 
an example to see how responses are being done and how they can be improved. 
In the following section (3), a multi-regulatory analysis of the existing sources of 
law and policy is undertaken in order to identify which are the possible sources 
that could be applicable in case of cyber-threats and cyber-attacks to CIs in the 
 
 
9The monistic approach of sources of law and policy as opposed to the pluralistic approach is and 
approach according to which the sources of law are hierarchical and not interactive. 
10This study drawn on the theoretical approach of polycentrism and pluralism in law as treated by 
the legal thinking of Petersen, Zahle and Arnaud. See Petersen, H., & Zhale, H. (1995). Legal Poly-
centrycity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law. Dartmouth Publishing Company; Arnaud A. J. 
(1995). Legal Pluralism and the Building of Europe. In Petersen, H., & Zhale, H. (Eds), Legal Poly-
centrycity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (pp. 127-149). Darthmouth Publishing Company.  
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EHN areas. In particular, in this section 3, the domestic system of Norway is 
taken as a source of inspiration to design a framework to protect CIs against cy-
ber-threats under ECIC conditions. Finally, the last section (4) presents conclu-
sions (4.1), recommendations (4.2) and future pathways linking environmental 
governance and cybersecurity (4.3) directed to policy-makers and international 
organizations on how to face the challenges of regulatory fragmentation and 
imperfections of international law applicable under ECIC, using the Norwegian 
model as a source of inspiration. 
2. Exceptionally Critical Infrastructure Conditions (ECIC)  
Forged by Climate Change and Cyber-Threats 
The Arctic and the EHN provides a lucid case to examine CIs11 operating under 
extraordinary special climatic and harsh environmental conditions. The impact 
of climate change in the Arctic could be more devastating than in other areas of 
the world. This means that the national critical infrastructures of the EHN 
simply become “exceptionally critical”. Increased sea levels, due to melting 
glaciers threaten the coastal regions, infrastructures and people who live in re-
motes and difficult distances. The increasing risk of flooding of the ecological 
Arctic basins affects human security, health and safety of the ecological Arctic basins. 
CIs in the energy sector, connected with major military installations and hur-
ricane evacuation routes are more vulnerable to impacts of climate change. Since 
it has been scientifically proven that climate change is affecting the Arctic more 
rapidly than the rest of the planet, this renders an already vulnerable CIs sector 
even more vulnerable. 
The energy sector including fuel supply (gas and oil) is already the top vulnerable 
sector12 compared to all the other CIs. This is a crucial sector also because it is 
highly interconnected with other critical infrastructures (transportation, electricity, 
communication, etc.) in what is defined as “critical infrastructure dependencies”.13 
This means that if there were a cyber-attack14 on the energy sector, it would also re-
flect in the other, dependent, CIs nested in the web of the critical infrastructures. 
 
 
11The term critical infrastructure is defined as physical and information systems networks, services, 
and assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a devastating impact on the health, safety, 
security, or economic well-being of citizens or the active functioning of governments. The most 
common associated critical infrastructures are energy, finance, transport, communications, water 
supply, agriculture and food production, public health and security services (police and military). It 
is worth noticing that, the precise definition and what this definition should include in the concept, 
is not the same in all countries. Nevertheless, there is some guidance from the EU and NATO con-
cerning what is considered as being a critical infrastructure. Tsagourias N. & Buchan R., (2015). Re-
search Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace: Edward Elgar.  
12See more at 
https://www.worldenergy.org/news-and-media/press-releases/new-cyber-report-energy-sector-prim
e-target-for-cyber-attacks/.  
13On the Critical Infrastructure Dependencies, see more at: 
https://triecker.wordpress.com/tag/critical-infrastructure-protection/.  
14Cyber-attacks is a generic term for attacks on the e-facilities of governments, such as critical infra-
structures, business, and citizens. This include, for example, spam, denial of access service attacks, 
spyware, and hacking. See Radzziwill, Y. (2015). Cyber-Attacks and the Exploitable Imperfections of 
International Law. Brill Nijholff; Gorge, M. (2007). Cyberterrorism: Hype or reality? Computer 
Fraud & Security.  
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In the light of this extreme vulnerability, it is worth noticing that both the 
energy and electricity sectors are amongst the only critical infrastructure sectors 
with mandatory cyber-security standards15 and thus regulated both by the public 
and private sectors. For example, if it is considered the energy power plants, 
these can be owned both by the state and by private companies. In that sense, the 
ECIC, is a concept according to which the “exceptionally critical infrastructure 
conditions”, are forged by the sea level rise, coupled with storm surges which 
will continue to increase the risk of major coastal impacts on transportation in-
frastructure, including both temporary and permanent flooding of airports, 
ports and harbors, road, rail lines, tunnel, bridges, maritime routes interrupted 
with vessels in distress, with the risk that entire populations could remain com-
pletely isolated from the rest of the world. 
Due to the existence of the two cumulative effects of cascading effects to CIs, 
the nexus between the exceptional vulnerability of critical infrastructure under 
these special climatic conditions and cyber-threats needs a special care to be mi-
tigated, regulated and managed. This special care, should not only be understood 
from a concrete, practical and management side, to mitigate the risks of both 
cyber security insecurity and climatic conditions, but as an urgent need to design 
a special proactive legal protection that could actually provide real protection in-
cluding risk assessment due to the existence of the cumulative effects of cascad-
ing effects to CIs. 
A cyber-attack to critical infrastructure in the energy sector under ECIC can 
be compared to extreme climatic events, because of the unpredictability, the ra-
pidity and vulnerability of the area touched with the consequences of a profound 
black out, in an environment with less resilience. In such an environment, the 
time needed to go back to normality would certainly be longer. The threats are 
also changing rapidly and it impossible to predict what this change will look like, 
even if in a short horizon of time, which makes it very difficult to design mitiga-
tion strategies from a political and legal vantage point. Even adaptation plans 
from a climate change law and policy perspectives, will be difficult to draw, es-
pecially from a proactive approach rather than reactive. 
Such problems, might even lead us to think about a new idea to enlarge the 
notion of adaptation to climate change, in order to include in it, also cy-
ber-threats as well, and their consequence on the environment and human secu-
rity, since energy critical infrastructure are closely woven into environmental 
climatic conditions, and cannot be managed and regulated one at a time for the 
sake of human security and to avoid human disasters. 
2.1. How Does the Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructures under  
ECICof the EHN Contribute to the Notion of Human Security at  
Global Level? 
The world is at a point of non-return for an historical transformation from fossil 
 
 
15Zhang, Z. (2013). Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting our 
Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats. Boston University Journal of Science and Technology 
Law, 19.  
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fuel to an energy system of global interconnected infrastructures where the 
power network from generation to transmission and distribution to consump-
tion is dependent on information and cyber technologies. The future network 
will encompass hundreds of millions Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) such 
as solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, energy storage devises, smart gr-
ids and other power electronics.  
On the one hand, this energy system transformation will create great op-
portunities for the business sector. On the other hand, energy systems net-
works will become targets of significant threats. Given the easy and speed at 
which malicious cyber activities occurs and the low cost of cyber weapons, the 
anonymity that cyberspace16 affords and the interconnectivity of networks, 
malicious cyber activities pose a serious threat not only to individuals, corpo-
rations and industry but also for states.17 The discussion on the possibility of a 
cyber-war, which shifts the attention from civilian to military engagement to 
potential attacks against state infrastructures, especially when hypothetical 
threats and the consequence on societal security are in play, is an argument 
justifying the need to consider the concept of human security in a broader 
context at global level, not only confined to state security and to physical ac-
tions. 
The role of international law can be relevant for maintaining access to cyber-
space but also in dealing with such threats. Cyberspace where global digital 
communication and any kind of critical infrastructure operate, is an “interna-
tional and global space”, thus subject to international law.  
Different international law frameworks may be applicable and can over-
lap, as will be explained in section 3 of this article. One type of cyber 
threats, could be a cyber-attack, which can be addressed both by interna-
tional law regime on the use of force (jus ad bellum) or in peace time (jus in 
bellum). 
The EHN face different kinds of security risks that range from disputes over 
territory and maritime delimitations weapon testing, shipping accidents or ma-
rine pollution, hazardous accidents and waste disposals, competition for living 
or non-living resources, and the adverse effects of climate change increasing the 
frequency of extreme events. The sources of all these threats are both human and 
environmental. The consequences of these threats affect both human security 
and the integrity of the natural world. In addition, if the Arctic regions were af-
fected from these threats, this would have enormous repercussions, not only in 
the Arctic region, but also in the rest of the world. Note the “cascading effects of 
the Arctic” means that what happen in the Arctic, does not stay there, but re-
 
 
16Cyberspace or Cyber-Realm is a virtual realm created as a result of the use of information technol-
ogy. See Radzwill, Y. (2015). Cyber–Attack and the Exploitable Imperfection of International Law. 
Glossary, Brill Nijhoff. 
17Tsagourias & Buchan (2015). Cyber-Threats and International Law. In “Security and International 
Law” Edited by Footer, E. M, Schimt, J., White D. N., Bright, D. L (Eds.). Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon. 
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flects in the rest of the planet.18 
Hence, the authors of the present article advocate that the concept of human 
security is tied to cyber-security19 which is now including the security of CIs 
against cyber-threats. 
The concept of human security is extremely controversial not only for the way 
that the different disciplines have conceptualized it,20 but also among proponents 
of different conceptualizations within single disciplines.  
Security is a societal value, a political goal and also a tool of protection, of risk 
reduction, certainty and predictability in contrast to danger risk and threat. Se-
curity in an objective sense measure the absence that such values will be attacked. 
Security in an intersubjective sense, is “what actors make of it” by putting relev-
ance to issues which are considered at utmost importance and which require 
“extraordinary measures”.21 The concept of human security refers to a funda-
mental shift in the referent object of security from the state world (national, re-
gional international or global security) to a people–centered approach. In that 
sense, not only human beings, families, and communities constitute a “referent 
object” but also humankind.22 This is a non-traditional way to conceive the con-
cept of human security and also the main approach used in this article.  
In the Arctic and in the EHN areas the additional increase resource competi-
tion between major powers and strategies with additional risks and conflicts, 
such as nuclear, bioenergy, energy are all digitalized, and thus the risk of cyber 
threats against their CIs will increase. 
The concept of human security should therefore include the protection 
against the risk of cyber-attacks to CIs. The notion of human security should be 
a dynamic one as well and should also include cyber-security and take into con-
sideration in the wide range of threats to security (such as human rights viola-
tions, drugs, terrorism, piracy) also cyber-attacks linked to environmental 
threats and in particular those against critical infrastructures in the energy sector 
because more exposed to environmental conditions and social vulnerability. 
At the United Nations (UN) level, the environmental dimension of interna-
tional security proposed a fourth human security dimension pillar as “Freedom 
 
 
18Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), Forth Assessment Report: Climate Change. 
(2007). Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; IPCC: Author. Cassotta S., et al. 
(2016). Climate Change and Human Security in a Multi-level and Multidisciplinary Dimension: The 
Case of the Arctic Environmental Ocean. In Climate Change Management, Springer, Berkam P. A. & 
Vylegzhanin A. (2010). Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean. Nato Science for Peace and Se-
curity Series: C Environmental Security, Springer. 
19In the 20013 EU Strategy, the term cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and actions 
that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those 
threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information in-
frastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and in-
frastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein. 
20The concept of human security in international relations, in the scientific discourse or at theoreti-
cal analytical level or in legal terms, differs significantly. 
21Wæver, O. (1995), (1997), (2008). In Sheffran J., et al. (2012). Climate Change, Human Security 
and Violent Conflicts in the Anthropocene, Springer, 3. 
22Brauch, H.G., et al. (2012). Global Human and Environmental Security Handbook for the Anthro-
pocene. Springer.  
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from Hazard Impacts”.23 While hazard cannot be prevented, their impact can be 
preventative reduced. The background for this fourth pillar of human security as 
“Freedom from Hazard Impacts” is to deal with the environment, sustainable 
development, disasters, early warning, disaster preparedness and reduction of 
social vulnerability. 
In essence, human security can be viewed as a holistic global transnational 
non-traditional approach. A crucial aspect of the concept of human security that 
has emerged on the international agenda is “energy security” defined by the In-
ternational Security Agency (ISA) as the “uninterrupted availability of energy 
resources at an affordable price.”24 
This means that also cyber-threats should be taken into account to guarantee 
the availability and affordability in a way to create a link between CIs, energy 
and cyber-security under the umbrella of the concept of human security to 
guarantee security and to try to govern freedom from risk of hazard. There are 
currently no treaties or regional agreements that guarantee such a linkage.  
In the EHN, the security agenda could thus be said to encompass all interna-
tional rules that regulate and guide human conduct and the concept of human 
security should be used to design an agreement protecting CIs against cy-
ber-attacks under ECIC conditions. Arctic human security is to be conceived 
broader that regional as a wide range of international law is relevant despite the 
gaps due to the presence of both states and rural human indigenous population, 
even if smaller. 
In the Arctic and specifically in the EHN regions the human security agenda 
should include cybersecurity and elaborate a sort of “Arctic energy security 
agenda under ECIC conditions” that could encompass international, regional or 
national rules that regulate in a proactive way and guide human security. 
At a general global level, and not only in relation to the Arctic, the notion of 
human security should be broadened in order to include cyber threats against 
critical infrastructures in the energy sector. The Arctic is an example showing 
the need for broadening the notion of human security from a traditional to a 
non-traditional way to perceive the phenomenon. The reason why it is impera-
tive to broaden the notion of human security is given by the fact that CIs on the 
energy sector are extremely vulnerable to climatic conditions. CIs are also key 
arteries both for civilian and military strategies and also more exposed to cy-
ber-attacks, which combined with climatic conditions and climate change ef-
 
 
23As in the political debate in the UN, the scientific discourse on human security and scientific ef-
forts to define this concept have primarily focused on three pillars: a) “freedom from fear” address-
ing the conflict and humanitarian agenda; b) “freedom from want” in the context of the human de-
velopment agenda; and c) “freedom to live in dignity” with reference to human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance. See Report of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security Human 
Security from Theory to Practice, and overview of Human Security Concept and the UN Trust Fund 
for Human Security, Human Security Unit – UN, and the Report for the United Nations University 
Institute on Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), in Braunch, H. G., (2012). Re concep-
tualizing Security: A Contribution for the 4th phase of research on human security and environmen-
tal security and peace (HSEP). Proceeding for the ISA Conference in Montreal, Canada. 
24See more at https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity. 
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fects, could result in a disastrous binomial combination. In the Arctic, climatic 
conditions are harsh, and therefore climate change has been linked to security by 
means of the concept of “climate security” and another component extremely 
relevant and sensitive for Arctic security, is the issue of energy security.  
The notion of human security should therefore encompass cyber-security and 
should be perceived holistically. In turns, this call for a set of rules that addresses 
and guide human conduct and that should be designed in a way to cover not 
only conflicts among states, but also among citizens, private sectors and stock-
holders. Civil society’s use of energy resources and the protection of CIs under 
ECIC and management of the cybersecurity space under which these infrastruc-
ture operates, should be regulated, and with a holistic vision, interconnecting all 
the dots. In the EHN, however, cyber-threats have not been included in the no-
tion of security. Security, in the Arctic, in the traditional sense, has encompassed 
a series of issues, such as transportation of nuclear weapons by sea or nuclear 
weapons. Today, the notion of human security must also include cyber-threats, 
especially against CIs due to the increasing of the number of networks especially 
in the energy sector. 
In addition, human security is not only physical but with cyber threats, be-
comes also a “virtual human security risk”. This implies that the society must be 
protected by rules regulating this new kind of human security risks. Society’s 
growing dependency on critical infrastructures and systems has given birth to a 
new class of cyber-physical threats that may facilitate physical attacks with a cy-
ber-attack: a so-called “cyber enabled attack on CIs”. 
The attack would be virtual but with a physical impact striking, not only hu-
man and environmental spheres but also the most vulnerable people of the Arc-
tic: the indigenous people living in remotes areas and who are often confronted 
with a harsh environment. Therefore, a broader notion of human security in the 
case of the EHN would include special features that provide protection for 
people living in close contact with the environment and climatic conditions 
which are more exposed to the impact of cyber-attacks. This mainly because of 
the proximity and the nexus among Arctic critical infrastructures in the energy 
sector under ECIC, energy resources and indigenous style life, which need spe-
cial legal protection. 
Human security approach to CIs under ECIC conditions would thus address 
sources of insecurity which require a private and public security approach based 
on rule of law and effective enforcement and a legal framework able to guarantee 
a threshold of severity. Such a threshold-based approach useful to establish when 
it can be established that human security is at threat and that limit threats by 
their severity rather than their cause, still need to be fixed. 
2.2. Focus on the Energy Sector: Peculiarities, Climatic Conditions,  
Cyber-Threats and the Case of Norway as an Example of ECIC 
The analysis of hypothetical threats on computerized objects that society relies 
upon, begins with the critical infrastructures of the energy sector, a top priority 
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in the range of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, as already observed in the 
previous section. Discussing cyber-threats to critical infrastructures in the ener-
gy sector in the Arctic is challenging because it is possible to observe this phe-
nomenon only by looking at hypothetical incidents since these kinds of threats, 
have never really occurred, yet.  
Nevertheless, outside the Arctic, the world is certainly not exempted from 
cases of cyber-attacks of this genre.25 
The tendency, today, is to acknowledge through military exercise, the protec-
tion of critical infrastructures of the energy sector. In particular, it has been 
stressed that during such operations, power grids are the most vulnerable parts. 
In a more concrete way, what is at the most risk and a highly vulnerable sys-
temic element is what is defined as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA), which is a computerized control system that monitors and regu-
lates physical industrial processes. In particular, the SCADA in system of power 
grids is highly vulnerable, especially during a hypothetical ice storm, which is the 
EHN, occurs frequently. 
Cyber-attacks against again critical infrastructures in the energy sector man-
agement also shuts down electricity for a prolonged period of time, and have 
devastating effects, also on other critical infrastructures, especially on commu-
nications and the gas industry.  
Energy power stations are connected to each other and to a centralized 
SCADA system, which also explains the high vulnerability of this sector that be-
comes extra critical under Arctic climatic conditions, thus putting the whole 
system at high risks. 
The national security implications of climate change include threats to risks to 
energy and critical infrastructures operating under extreme events. These events 
affect energy production as well as transportation, transmission and distribution 
infrastructure, with the possibility of causing supply disruptions of immense 
magnitude, exposing Arctic zones to complete isolation due to the black out of 
electricity supply. In addition, higher summer temperatures will increase elec-
tricity use causing higher summer peak loads while warmer winters will decrease 
energy demands for heating. 
Cyber-attacks in the Arctic could occur under certain climatic conditions de-
termining sea-level rise, or extreme storm surge events, all of which would in-
tensify the consequence of these cyber-attacks and impact on coastal facilities 
and infrastructures on which many energy system, markets and consumers de-
 
 
25Amongst the examples of cyber-attacks to critical infrastructures to the energy sector, it should be 
recalled: 1) the Nigerian Pipeline explosion in 2006, that was reported to have killed at least 260 peo-
ple, 2) the famous 2003 cyber-attack employing the Stuxnet work and aimed at crippling the Iranian 
nuclear program, involving also health hazard, 3) the 1995 cyber-attack against the US Departments 
of Defence and Energy, giving the Argentinian cracker Julio Ardita access to satellite, radiation and 
energy research, 4) the 2012 cyber-attack against the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) when 
the Shamon virus wiped out hard disks on thirty thousand computers leading Saudi Arabia to con-
clude that it was an attack against, its economy, possibly from Iran, 5) the 1999 attack against the 
Russian Gazprom directed at the digital system controlling gas flows in pipelines.  
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pend which will in turn high cause disruptions of essential services across the 
EHN.26 
In the Nordic countries, compared with aerospace, defense, healthcare, ship-
ping and government, the energy sector is among the second key sector at risk 
for cyber-attacks. This sector is particularly relevant to Norway’s resources and 
role as a top supplier to the EU. In particular, Norway’s key industries at risks 
are those of oil and gas exploration, production and distribution, green energy 
development and industrial control systems. 
Norway is increasing its portion of the market in supplying the EU and Baltic 
States, despite the dependence of these countries on Russian energy, which has 
decreased following the Ukrainian crisis.27 This is also a sector where Norway 
plays a particular role, also from a geopolitical perspective because it provides an 
alternative to dependence on Russian gas. Norway has also a big responsibility in 
trying to disentangle Europe and the Baltic States from Russia. This explains 
why Norway’s police claim that Russia is increasing its intelligence collection 
with regards to the Norwegian energy sector, with the intent to sabotage it.28 The 
Norwegian government is well aware on the fact that the nation should be kept 
prepared for the improbable and the existence of a real threat for the Norwe-
gians energy providers.29 The Norwegian private sector, in particular, the com-
panies, already perceive themselves at risk and find it difficult to prepare for 
something that might happen, but has not happened already. In 2014, around 50 
companies in the oil and energy sector were exposed to the biggest attack in 
Norway’s history.30 In August of the same year, the Norway’s National Security 
Authority (NSM) reported that among the 50 companies, also Statoil firm was 
compromised. Other 250 Norwegians companies were advised to check their 
networks for evidence of malicious activity. 
This activity is believed to be associated with the Russian’s actors behind the 
Ferger/Havex malware31 family that has been referred to by other researcher as 
“Energetic Bear” or “Dragonfly”.32 Society’s vulnerability will only increase not 
only because of evident cyber-threats but also considering that by 2019 “smart 
meters”, which are Advance Metering Infrastructures, will be installed in all 
Norwegian households providing increased capacity of electric power supply 
which will also increase the vulnerability to cyber-attacks at the same time. The 
 
 
26Report from the White House, Washington (2015). Findings form Selected Federal Reports: The 
National Security Implications of a Changing Climate-Readiness in a Changing Arctic), 7. 
27Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguish-
ing natural gas security from geopolitics, (2014) retrieved from: 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf.  
28Norway Intelligence Claims Russian Intelligence Intensifies Monitoring Norwegian Energy Activi-
ties. The Nordic Page. (24 March 2015). 
29Report from the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM), the Norwegian Police Security 
Service (PST) and the Norwegian Government’s Cyber Security Strategy for Norway (2012). 
30Skotnes, R. Ø. (2015). Challenges for safety and security management of network companies due to 
increased use of ICT in the electric power supply sector. Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Social Science: 
University of Stavanger. 
31Malware is a malicious software used to facilitate or carry out cyber-attacks. 
32Report, Fireeye Threat Intelligence. (2015a). Cyber Threats to the Nordic Region. 10.  
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Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported events of cyber-espionage in 2013 
as well as reporting that it has been victim of cyber espionage and data theft of 
political intelligence for approximately four years. Even though the Finns did 
not identify any suspects, it is believed that, Russian, and the Chinese actors 
were behind the event.33 
2.3. Link between CI’s Cybersecurity under ECIC Conditions and  
International Cooperation: NATO’s Role 
Regional cooperation on cyber security for critical infrastructure in the energy 
sector is aimed at controlling and making secure any disclosure of vulnerabilities 
and incidents affecting the energy sector in its crucial role and meeting the need 
for effective communication. This also includes cooperation and collaboration 
among stakeholders.34 The linkage between environmental governance, particu-
larly between climate change and cybersecurity under ECIC conditions is im-
portant in term of responses occurring through international cooperation, for 
example to achieve resilience. In that context, it is relevant to stress that linking 
environmental governance to cybersecurity and to resilience is of specific inter-
est. Specifically, what is of interest, is the link that has been made with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s approach in this regards. Approaches 
for Arctic risks assessment and resilience in the EHN as defined by both civilian 
and military agencies, are focusing on system resilience which are required for 
unknown and hybrid threats. Resilience and increased civil-military readiness is 
recognized as a key NATO goal in the Warsaw Summit of 2016.35 The Warsaw 
Summit discussed threat to digitalized CIs including anthropogenic (i.e. cy-
ber-attacks) as well as environmental threats (i.e. natural threats such as space 
weather or other extreme weather events). Nevertheless, there is no explicit co-
operation or coordination among the EHN’ areas under ECIC conditions. It is 
also worth noticing that sometimes NATO nation member states and EU Mem-
ber States do not correspond. There is a need to bind and build up a framework 
that interconnects countries that are not included in the different frameworks 
such as, for example, Finland and Sweden that are members of the EU but not of 
NATO, and Norway which is not a member of the EU but a member of NATO. 
This is because all the systems are interconnected especially in the energy grids. 
The protection of energy grids has various aspects and there is no such EHN’s 
framework except some kind of collaboration and form of cooperation in cyber 
security between NATO and the EU. This should be defined in a cyber-response 
 
 
33Report, Fireeye Threat Intelligence. (2015b). Cyber Threats to the Nordic Region. 13. 
34The cooperation and role of stakeholders has been particularly highlighted by Elinor Ostrom’s 
framework on polycentric governance. This author produced an important study connecting cy-
ber-attack, CIs and the environment. Particularly, the study on Institutional Analysis and Design 
(IAD) and Socio-Economical Systems (SES) frameworks to the topic of atmospheric governance 
which suits the purpose of complementing the gaps of law. See Ostrom, E. (2012a). Polycentrism 
Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organization. In Global Environmental 
Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges Involving a Diversity of Organization. Eric Brous-
seau, et al. eds, 105, 177. 
35Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by Head of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016-06/July/2016, Press Release (2016). 
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framework taking into account harsh environmental conditions as a conse-
quence of climate change impacts, namely resilience The basis and fundaments 
of such a necessity is not inconsequential if it is considered that EHN areas often 
cooperates in different efforts aimed enhancing cyber security, not only from a 
logistic point of view but also in terms of research. Two examples of such kinds 
of EHN collaboration are, firstly, the Nordic Cyber Security Exercise conducted 
in Linköping in 2015.36 The exercise was a strategic collaborative effort for en-
hancing cyber security within the Nordic Countries. The collaboration was part 
of efforts to assess and strengthen cyber preparedness, examine incident re-
sponse processes in response to ever-evolving threats and most importantly, en-
hance information sharing amongst Nordic countries.37 A second example is the 
effort of the Finnish Cyber Environment Project started in 2014 analyzing cy-
bersecurity trends and the current status of and development needs in the public 
and private sectors in six countries, including Sweden.38 However, it seems that 
there is a lack of awareness concerning the need to establish a special framework 
for EHN countries, taking into account ECIC conditions except for a recognition 
of the need to establish a special coordination and cooperation in the EHN on 
resilience. Nevertheless, resilience is a concept that is not only pertinent to cli-
matic and environmental conditions but also to human, socio-technical, societal, 
organizational, political and transnational conditions.39 The national programme 
focuses on societal security in the Nordic programme administered by the Re-
search Council of Norway. It dedicates attention to the effects of climate change 
on security implications of climate change and critical infrastructures, especially 
after examination of the positions of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.40 
The problem of coordination and cooperation in case of attack to CIs in the 
energy sector in EHN countries would still arise for those countries that are not 
members of NATO, such as Finland and Sweden. So, developing an internation-
al practice involving also non-NATO countries, would be prudent, especially by 
starting to identify, common core problems. In that sense, it is worth noticing 
that a Joint Cyber Trading Nordic Priority Programme exists in the area of cyber 
warfare technology under the umbrella of the military–run Nordic Defense Co-
operation (NORDEFCO) programme. This programme pools information 
gained from military operated cyber defense centers with research and intelli-
gence units. The NORDEFCO’s pan-Nordic Warfare Collaboration Project 
(CWCP) also interacts with the NATO CCDCE.41 Even though the CCDCE 
 
 
36Press release. (2015). Nordic Cyber Security exercise was conducted in Linköping, Centre for Cyber 
Security. 
37The objective of the exercise were to strengthen the Nordic National CERT Collaboration (NCC) 
and to develop collaboration on a technical level and testing the existing standards of cooperation 
procedures and mechanism as effective responses to Nordic Cyber-crises requires cross-country co-
operation. 
38Press Release, Finnish cyber security environment-current situations, targets and measures to 
achieve these, 2017, 77, Prime Minister’s Office. 
39Report, Norden, NordForsk, (2013). Societal Security in the Nordic Countries. Policy Paper 1, 6. 
40Report, Norden, NordForsk, (2013). Societal Security in the Nordic Countries. Policy Paper, 23-24. 
41Opitz, C., (2015). Potential for Nordic Baltic Security Cooperation-Shared Threat Perceptions 
Strengthens Regional Collaboration, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
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primarily serves the objectives of NATO and the NATO nations, it is worth no-
ticing that it does run cooperation and coordination projects jointly with specia-
lized cyber military and law enforcement agencies in NATO partners’ countries, 
which includes Sweden and Finland the two non-NATO members.42 
2.4. Cyber Threats against the Backdrop of Regional and Industry  
Collaboration and Cooperation 
The EHN and the Arcticregion has benefited from strong international coopera-
tion, through official and unofficial channels and involving Arctic Eight,43 Arctic 
Five,44 as well as neighboring Arctic states.45 Some of examples of productive 
Arctic cooperation include the Agreement on Cooperation and Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR), developed under the canopy of 
the Arctic Council and signed by the eight Arctic states, and the Treaty between 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Deli-
mitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (Treaty be-
tween Norway and Russian Federation”) that put a four-decade maritime boun-
dary dispute between at rest. Yet despite the clear benefit of and occasional need 
for cooperation, competition takes center stage, often clad in military fatigues. 
Thus, the international dynamic in the region is also characterized, inter alia, by: 
1) the competition among the Artic littoral states over economic space and geo-
political influence; 2) the struggle of non-littoral Arctic states to not be oversha-
dowed by the Arctic Five; and 3) the effort of economic powers to ensure that 
their interests are protected once Arctic ice recedes.46 The image of a Russian 
submarine planting a flag on the seafloor at the North Pole illustrate the conflict-
ing nature of international relations in the Arctic.47 The tension between coopera-
tion and competition is particularly present in the EHN. For example, the Russian 
Federation resumed Cold War era bomber patrols over the Norwegian exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in 2007.48 The annexation of Crimea in 2014 brought the 
tensions between Russia and the West to a new level. Yet the competition is 
eclipsed by arguably the most fruitful and extensive cooperation in the entire 
Arctic. EHN, has seen international cooperation on virtually every level and of 
every kind. Established by the Kirkenes Declaration in 1993, the Barents 
 
 
42O’Dwyer, G., (2015). Join Cyber Training New Nordic Priority. White paper: Global Defense Pers-
pectives, see more at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense. 
43These counties include: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America. 
44Arctic littoral states. 
45E.g. the Russian Federation and Norway. 
46For example, six nations (China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Italy) were 
given an observer status at the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna on 15 May 2013. Arc-
tic Council, Observers, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers (last visited June 10, 
2013). 
47Russia Plants Flag under N Pole, BBC, (Aug. 2, 2007), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6927395.stm. 
48Russian Strategic Bombers Carry out North Patrols, Ria Novosti, (Sep. 12, 2012), available at 
http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120912/175920165.html. 
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Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) has been the forum for intergovernmental coop-
eration at the ministerial level.49 The Barents Regional Council, also founded 
under the Kirkenes Declaration in 1993, facilitates cooperation among “counties 
or their equivalents.”50 The BEAC has also supported cooperation among cul-
tural leaders, entrepreneurs, as well as educational and research institutions.51 
However, because only Norway and Russia have control over the continental 
shelf in the region, these two states are poised to work together on energy issues. 
The aforementioned Norway-Russia Treaty not only established a regime for 
development of joint hydrocarbon deposits but also mandated close cooperation 
should such a field be developed.52 The pre-Crimea era saw a flurry of joint in-
dustry initiative. The partnership between Russian and Norwegian oil and gas 
industries at large has become a natural fit, with the Norwegian side providing 
technological and operational know-how while filling a huge need on the Rus-
sian side.53 Barents 2020, a joint Norwegian-Russian initiative directed at har-
monization of health, safety, and environmental (HSE) standards serves as an 
example of multisectoral international cooperation.54 Barents 2020 was initiated 
and funded by the Norwegian government and involved government agencies, 
oil and gas industry, scientific and research institutions, and NGOs.55 Yet the 
cooperation was not only centered on the question of how to find and extract 
hydrocarbons in the most efficient and safe manner. Environmental groups in 
both countries worked together to raise awareness as to the question of whether 
offshore oil and gas development in the EHN is a sound policy decision.56 Indi-
genous communities across the region whose livelihoods are often affected the 
most by oil and gas development pondered the same question as well.57 As noted 
above Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula slowed down and, in some 
cases, halted cooperation completely. The United States and European Union 
imposed economic sanctions that all but ended oil and gas industry cooperation  
 
 
49Beac. St. Barents Euro-Arctic Council  
http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council.iw3 (last 
visited June 10, 2013). 
50Beac.St Barents Regional Council (BRC)  
http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Barents_Regional_Council.iw3  
(last visited June 10, 2013). 
51Beac.St, The Barents Projects, http://www.beac.st/?DeptID=25430 (last visited June 10, 2013). 
52Norway-Russia Treaty, Ann. II. 
53Hakon S. (2011). How to Establish Cross-Border Business and Become a Part of the Existing Sup-
ply Chain. (Eds), Frode Mellemvik and Sergey Vasilev [hereinafter Skretting].In Perspectives of 
Norwegian-Russian Energy Cooperation. 
54Barents (2012). Assessment of International Standards for Safe Exploration, Production and 
Transportation of Oil and Gas in the Barents Sea, Final Report Phase 4, 9. Bellona, Oil. 
55Id at 12. 
56Bellona, Oil http://www.bellona.org/subjects/Oil (last visited June 10, 2013). Bellona is an interna-
tional NGO founded in Norway with offices in Russia and other countries. Bellona, about Bellona, 
http://www.bellona.org/subjects/1140449074.91/aboutussection_view (last visited June 10, 2013). 
57Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Barents Indigenous People’s Office, Economic Development in the 
Indigenous North  
http://www.barentsindigenous.org/economic-development-in-the-indigenous-north.5143491.html 
(last visited June 10, 2013).  
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in offshore and Arctic projects.58 The 2017 round of sanctions imposed by U.S. 
Congress made any cooperation in the oil and gas sector a remote possibility.59 
An argument can be made that the prior transboundary bridges in the EHN can 
serve as pathways for cyber threats emanating from Russia. The Kremlin has a vi-
tal interest in developing Arctic offshore oil and gas deposits. Russia’s oil reserves 
are declining. In fact, Russia saw the largest decline in oil reserves in 2014, 1.9 bil-
lion, among oil producing states.60 The Russian leadership designated Arctic oil 
fields, including offshore as a key area for the “resource base expansion.”61 In fact, 
this area according to President Putin, will greatly contribute to Russia’s growth. 
Lomonosov once said that Russia will grow through Siberia—he was right, it 
is already happening. However, it will certainly grow through the Arctic. And 
not just because of its gigantic—global, I would say—all-planet mineral re-
sources. I am talking about oil, gas, and metals also, because this region is very 
suitable for developing a transportation infrastructure.62 
However, Russian companies need Western, particularly Norwegian, expertise 
to operate in Arctic waters. For example, Rosneft and ExxonMobil selected 
Norwegian company and Seadrill to operate the West Alpha drilling platform in 
the South Kara Sea.63 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to presume Kremlin’s 
motivation to engage in cyber espionage for the purpose of obtaining valuable 
technological data or carrying out a cyber-attack in retaliation for compliance 
with the sanctions or as a method convincing to cease complying with them. It is 
also possible that the prior attempts to cooperate (educational and industry ex-
changes, for example) could have been used by the Russian intelligence to “plant 
seeds’ in Norwegian, Swedish, and Finish computer networks. 
3. Legal and Policy Framework Applicable to ECIC in a  
Pluralistic and Polycentric Approach 
As introduced previously, this section explains that a coherent, homogenous 
regulatory framework protecting critical infrastructure in the Arctic and in the 
EHN specifically, is not in place. However, this does not mean that there is a le-
 
 
58U.S. Energy Information Administration, Russia, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS (last visited 15 December 2017). 
59Sidortsov, R. (2017a). At the Crossroads of Policy Ambitions and Political Reality: Reflections on 
the Prospects of LNG Development in Russia. Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal (OGEL), LNG Special 
Issue, 15. 
60BP. (2015). BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, Oil Reserves. Retrieved June 16, 2015, 
from 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-ene
rgy/review-by-energy-type/oil/oil-reserves.html. 
61Sidortsov, R. (2017b). The Russian Offshore Oil and Gas Regime: When Tight Control Means Less 
Order. In Pelaudeix, C., and Basse, E.M., (Eds.), Governance of Offshore Hydrocarbon Activities in 
the Arctic. 
62The President of Russia, All-Russia Youth Forum “Seliger”, 29 August 2014a, accessed 1 September 
2017 http://news.kremlin.ru/news/46507/print (hereinafter, Presidential meeting transcript, 29 Au-
gust 2014). 
63The President of Russia, Videoconference with the West Alpha Platform in the Kara Sea, 9 August 
2014b, accessed 1 September 2017 http://news.kremlin.ru/news/46421/print. 
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gal vacuum or that there are no laws applicable. It means that the combination 
of international law with a policy approach, which can be applicable, has not 
been identified yet. 
The following section of this article (3.1) will examine international law in a 
pluralistic and polycentric approach with particular reference to jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello, and on how they can coexists rather than being in a hierarchical 
relationship. Both jus ad bellum and jus in belloas are not “self-contained re-
gimes”. This means that they are related to each other and to other legal regimes 
pertaining to difference areas of law. Furthermore, both state and international 
organizations and behaviors of different actors are involved in the regulation, 
protection and management. 
From 3.1 to 3.4 this article will address the political component and explore 
how does international relations influence the design and the applicability of a 
possible framework applicable. In that sense, the discussion of the role of inter-
national organizations and the existence of cooperation already in place, as well 
as non-state actors is pertinent.  
The discussion on the applicability of international law and the analysis of 
how this law could “fit for purpose” is entrenched with the political factors that 
exercise a direct influence on the law applicability and in that sense law and pol-
icy are clearly interwoven. This investigation will lead to understand which the 
international law applicable can fit for purpose for the protection of critical in-
frastructures. Is it international law, international humanitarian law, space law or 
IT law? Which are the main actors connected to critical infrastructures for energy 
systems in the Arctic EHN and operating in the areas? Which kind of instruments 
would be available? For example, command and control, self-regulations, stan-
dards, voluntary measures, liability rules or risk assessment and management 
combined with private initiative or only public? The template of a possible 
framework that could fulfill this for purpose clearly denotes the characteristics of 
a regulatory package of mixed instruments. 
From a legal point of view, the theoretical approaches of polycentrism and 
pluralism, offer an important tool in explaining which law would best fits the 
purpose to protect critical infrastructures in the energy sector under ECIC con-
ditions and it is particularly suitable in the analysis and systematization of frag-
mentation in international law and multi-level governance. Polycentrism and 
pluralism is a theoretical approach useful to design comprehensive and coherent 
legal frameworks that systematize the game of multilevel governance. The design 
of a comprehensive and homogeneous framework is much needed to address 
cyber-attacks at both the domestic and international levels especially in order to 
understand how the different levels of sources can interact to complement each 
other and create an applicable more effective legal framework.64 This legal ap-
proach is complemented by a second theory of political science of polycentric 
governance applied to cyberspace from Elinor Ostrom which can help to con-
 
 
64Hathaway, O. A., et al. (2012). The Law of Cyber Attack, Yale School, California Law Review, Paper 
3852, 817-885.  
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ceptualize the dynamics of multi-regulatory systems, given it embrace a multis-
takeholder governance approach, norms, bottom-up regulations and targeted 
measures to enhance cybersecurity in the case of multipolar politics. Elinor Os-
trom, produced an important study applicable to cyber-attacks which is defined 
as an Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) and Social-Ecological Systems 
(SES) frameworks to the topic of atmospheric governance65 which suits the pur-
pose of complementing the gaps of the law. The law cannot explain it all and 
there is a need to analyze the “law in context” where international law cannot be 
separated from political context and the behaviors and interests of official and 
non-official actors, including international organizations and stakeholders.  
Just as this multilevel system is important for environmental governance in 
large ecological systems with distinct local dynamics, so too is it essential for 
enhancing cyber-security given the local, national and global impact of cy-
ber-attacks on economic development and human security. This is linked to the 
framework complexes that can form the theoretical substratum of cyberspace 
where several different systems coexists in the same issue area without clear hie-
rarchy which can be caused by various and continuously evolving of political 
coalitions.  
The regime complexes recognize the relevance of the need for industry best 
practices to proactively adopt the rapidly threat matrix based on risk assessment 
which could become a model for polycentric regulation or cyberspace.  
The regulatory environment where cyber-threats can occur is proactively im-
plementing not only public law but also private law due to the private sector, in-
cluding best practices to better manage cyber threats where standards apply.  
In order to understand not only the domestic, but also regional and interna-
tional legal mechanisms at play in regulating cyberspace and enhancing cy-
ber-security, it is relevant to analyze the possible applicability of international 
law that could fit the purpose. Certainly, for a policy vision, market, laws, norms, 
codes, standards, voluntary instruments have a major role to play within a poly-
centric framework applicable to cyber-attacks. 
The combination of law and policy for our analysis is key to understanding if 
multi-regulatory governance can improve cybersecurity in the Arctic. This could 
easily turn out to be “critical” for future enactment of technical, economical, le-
gal and policy lessons. It is relevant to understand if the current multi-regulatory 
system of regimes (law) in combination with institutional analysis of the main 
actors involved (policy) can help to improve a cyber space in the energy sector, 
under ECIC climatic conditions, as it will be outlined in the next section. 
3.1. International Law and the Main Institutional Actors Involved 
The role of international law is important in maintaining the security of the Arc-
tic in the EHN cyberspace in the face of threats of different nature and under 
different conditions, for example, during war time relating to the use of force 
(jus ad bellum) or during in peace time (jus in bellum).The objective of this sec-
 
 
65Ostrom, E. (2012b). A General Framework for analysing sustainability of social-ecological systems. 
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tion is to identify which are the different international law regimes applicable to 
the cyber threats to critical infrastructures with focus on the energy sector and 
their capacity to improve Arctic cyber-security. 
Practitioners, policy-makers, and academia have recognized that there is a 
need to develop a legal and political framework against cyber-threats to critical 
infrastructure in general, and not only specifically for the regional level of the 
Arctic. Such a framework does not exist. The existing international law applica-
ble in the EHN countries to cyber security is very fragmented with the absence 
of specific provisions pertaining to the cyber component typifying cyber threats 
that can be regulated and applied. It is extremely complex and uncertain if the 
provisions of the existing treaties that will be presented in this section, could 
become applicable to cyber-threats situations, not only for the subject matter but 
also because there have never been any cyber-attacks in the Arctic, and in the 
EHN targeting critical infrastructure in the energy sector until now. However, it 
is possible to include in the scope of the applicable international global treaty 
law, and by legal reasoning per analogia, the typified acts of cyber-threat that 
might occurring in the Arctic. Nevertheless, it is not possible to ascertain the ap-
plicability of the law with a logical theoretical exercise alone but only with the 
experience as well. A true understanding will come after the unfortunate 
event. 
The legal framework under jus ad bellum conditions to manage cyber-attacks 
to critical infrastructure in the Arctic is very fragmented and it is the one cov-
ered by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the law of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter, cyber space law, the law of state responsibility, international humanita-
rian law, international criminal law, international law applicable to terrorism, 
human rights law and IT law. Specifically, several treaties could apply, such as 
the UN Treaty, relevant treaties of space law, the International Criminal Court 
Treaty, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).66 As a valuable complement to understand and asses 
the international law applicable to cyber-threat, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operation (hereinafter the Tallinn Ma-
nual 2.0)67, an updated version of the Tallinn Manual 1.0, has produced exten-
sive analysis. 
The LOAC has opened up a debate among those who maintain that it could be 
easily applicable, especially to jus ad bellum conditions. Others advocate the 
 
 
66International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Doc. E, 95-2, (1978), 999 U.N.T.S, 
entered into force on March 25, 1976. 
67See Schmitt, M. & Vihul, L. (2017). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tallinn Manual 2.0 is the new version 
prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence which is replacing the old version of this manual published in 2013 
(Tallinn Manual 1.0).The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law applicable to Cyber Opera-
tions had made a significant contribution to clarifying the application the possible application of in-
ternational laws related to cyber uses of force and armed conflicts involving cyber operations. 
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need for a new regulatory structure, such as a treaty. A third category even de-
nies the usefulness of international law. However, the applicability of interna-
tional law and in particular of jus ad bellum is ascertained.  
The UN Charter is the most relevant instrument applying to cyber-threats 
because it lays down important principles and rules guiding the relations be-
tween states and establishes a collective security system. Thus, if the Security 
Council (SC) determine that there is a threat to peace and security, it can adopt 
military as well as non-military measures in order to maintain or restore peace 
and security.68 The frequency of cyber-attacks on state infrastructures especially 
when the targets are communications or energy facilities or energy structures 
that can both represent civilian and military targets, have pushed states to con-
sider them as “military attacks” and therefore requiring interpretation according 
to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty. This means engaging its collective self-defense 
mechanism in support. In that respect, in the Estonian case of 2007 for example, 
Estonia argued that the cyber-attacks against its country required engaging its 
collective and armed attack, within the meaning of Art. 5.  
However, NATO refused to engage Art. 5, and did established instead a Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn (Estonia) in order to en-
hance cyber security for NATO Member States. The raison d’être of the 
CCDCOE was thus that cyber-security can be best achieved through military 
means, which lead the Centre to publish the Tallinn Manual which represents to 
date, especially in its very recent second and latest version published in the cur-
rent year, the most important framework of international law applying to cy-
ber-warfare and specifically to attacks on critical infrastructure. 
However, the legal uncertainties and disagreement among over the precise de-
finition of “attack” still persist and the different nuances on what constitute and 
“attack” in this manual are numerous, especially when it is a question of estab-
lishing the threshold for when an attack should be viewed as the equivalent of 
an armed attack under international law because such a threshold is un-
known.69 
The manual does not offer a solution either for when critical infrastructures 
are strictly interconnected with military ones and the damage is unpredictable 
and uncontrollable. Nevertheless, the manual prove the existence of applicable 
customary norms and represents a valuable applicable instrument. 
In addition, also space law applies because outerspace is similar to cyberspace 
and they both deal with territorial and extraterritorial components. Like wea-
pons systems that have been developed to attack satellites, cyber-attacks could 
have a large-scale strategic impact. This means that among conventions covering 
 
 
68The UN Charter can address many facets of cyber-threats, for example cyber-threats that amount 
to a use of force or to an armed attack, as well as those that constitute a threat to, or a breach of, in-
ternational peace and security. 
69Schmitt & Vihul (2017). Tallinn Manual 2.0, on the International Law applicable to Cyber Opera-
tions (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rule 92 Definition of cyber-attack, 415-420; 
Schmitt, N. M. (2017). Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations under Interna-
tional Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum. Harvard National Security Journal, 8, 245. 
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infrastructures those concerning civil aviation may be the most relevant models 
to follow.70 Furthermore, laws covering acts against aviation infrastructures are 
very effective.71 
In that respect, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)72 which laid down the 
foundations for cyber space governance, can be applied to cyber-security re-
garding critical infrastructure, as well as the treaty on principles governing the 
activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies.73 In that sense, space and telecommunications sys-
tems are in that sense strictly interconnected. 
State responsibility remains also a key component in dealing with an attack on 
critical infrastructures in general, and specifically for the Arctic security. Threats 
also arise from states that may constitute violation of the state’s conventional or 
customary international law obligations. The matrix of state responsibility 
founded the conditions according to which states can be held directly or directly 
responsible for activities of its own organs. The law of war requires that a state 
must identify itself when it attacks another state under jus in bello according to 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for International Wrongful Acts. Also the international humanitarian law 
applies during an international or non-international armed conflict, and con-
tains provisions concerning the protection afforded to persons caught in the 
armed conflict. The applicable international conventions are the Hague Regula-
tions of 1899 and 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Ad-
ditional protocols of 1977 including all the principles of humanitarian law. In-
ternational criminal law applies when one of the four core crimes are committed 
using cyber means: 1) aggression, 2) genocide, 3) crimes against humanity and 
4) war crimes, Also international law applicable to terrorism can be applicable in 
the case of cyber-attack to critical infrastructures. In that sense the relevel appli-
cable convention is the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971)74 and the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.75 In addition, there are a number of in-
ternational treaties on human rights that can be applied such as the ICCPR as 
 
 
70Goodman, S. (2008). Critical Information Infrastructures Protection: Responses to Cy-
ber-terrorism, Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey Editions, IOS Press, 
32. 
71Example of Civil Aviation Conventions applicable to critical infrastructures are the Civil Aviation 
Convention of 1944 and 1963. 
72Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which is a treaty that forms the basis of interna-
tional space law. The treaty was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10 October 1967. 
73Shackelford, S., J. (2014). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law Business, and Relations in 
Search of Cyberspace: An Introduction to the law of Cyber War and Peace. Cambridge University 
Press, 274. 
74Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, (Montreal 
Convention) 1971. 
75International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing on 15 December 1997. 
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mentioned above, but also the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR),76 
and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.77 Finally, International 
Communication Law is relevant. It was in many circumstances the precursor to 
cyber law. In that sense, the Convention applying is the International Telecom-
munication Union Convention against “harmful interference” more concretely 
it’s Annex 3 stating that: “anyone that endangers … safety services, or seriously 
degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service …” 
The safety services include technologies, human life and property including crit-
ical infrastructures and energy plants. Nevertheless, there are no mandatory en-
forcement mechanisms.  
With regards, to the law applicable under jus in bellum, it is always difficult 
to understand if an attack should be viewed as the equivalent of an armed at-
tack under international law because the threshold for when it is considered 
as such is unknown. Some authors have argued that an attack could be consi-
dered as an “armed attack” when comparable to the effect of a nuclear wea-
pon. 
Several bilateral and multilateral agreements are applicable to secure the cyber 
space of Arctic critical infrastructures specifically for the protection of the ener-
gy sector. In that respect, some of the most important instrument when it comes 
to criminal offences, are the European Council Convention (better known as the 
Budapest Convention),78 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),79 and the dozen of Multilateral Legal Assistance Treaties (MLTA)80 
that could be used to seek criminal prosecution of cyber-attacks that either spe-
cifically mention IT or are broad enough to cover all law enforcement investiga-
tions.81 In addition, also the International Maritime Organization (IMO) treaty,82 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL),83 the already mentioned Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement (SAR 
Agreement)84 and the 2013 Oil Pollution Agreements,85 can be taken into ac-
 
 
76European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is an international treaty to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Europe. Drafted in 1950 by the then newly formed Council of Europe, the 
convention entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
77American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José, is international hu-
man rights. It was adopted by many countries in the Western Hemisphere in San José, Costa Rica on 
22 November 1969. 
78The Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime of 2001, entered into force on the 1 July 2004). 
79United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982. The Convention has been ratified 
by many countries except for the United States. The United States has refused to ratify the conven-
tion because of the deep-sea bed mining provision. 
80A mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) is an agreement between two or more countries for the 
purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws. 
81With regards to the Multilateral Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) it is worth noticing that Norway 
does not have a MLAT with the US. 
82International Maritime Organization (IMO), known as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consul-
tative Organization (IMCO) until 1982. 
83International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL, 73/78), 1973 as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978. 
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count for their possible applicability. 
As previously mentioned, one of the most relevant international criminal law 
treaties applying is the European Council Convention on Cybercrime that aim to 
establish a common criminal policy among parties by adopting appropriate leg-
islation and by fostering international cooperation. States investigate on certain 
offences and cooperate on the investigation and prosecution of such offences. 
The Convention requires states to criminalize illegal access, interception, data 
interference and system interference including energy power infrastructures. 
Russia, which is an Arctic country, deliberately withdrew its signature from this 
treaty. 
An interesting parallel that can be traced is with the one between the law of 
the sea and cyberspace, especially with the UNCLOS. Several provisions of the 
UNCLOS are potentially applicable to the cyber-security of critical infrastructure 
in the energy sector such as for example, Article 19 and Article 113.86 Article 19 
states that states should not use another nation’s territorial sea to engage in ac-
tivities prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of coastal state. This in-
cludes the collection of information, distribution of propaganda, or interference 
with any system of communications. Article 113 requires domestic criminal leg-
islation to punish willful damage to submarine cables. Article 19 should be also 
applicable to Article 21 and 113 claims involving submarine cables because this 
would include also cyber attackers who send code through submarine cables to a 
costal state, thus breaching of UNCLOS.87 
The MLAT agreements could be used to seek criminal prosecution of cy-
ber-attacks given that they include IT and cover all the enforcement. Several 
Arctic Countries are part of these conventions, specifically, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway. Even though these Arctic countries are part of the MLAT it does not 
regulate only among the Arctic states themselves but rather stipulates agree-
ments with non-Arctic states. After examining the IMO treaty, the MARPOL, 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, the SAR 
Agreement and the 2013 Oil Pollution Agreement that can be applicable to cyber 
threats on critical infrastructure in the energy sector of the Arctic states, it is as-
certained that there are no provisions that could be applicable to cyber-threats 
under ECIC in the EHN countries. 
From all the above, it is clear that international law shows evident imperfec-
tions and does not cover the situation of cyber-threats under ECIC conditions in 
 
 
84The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement (formally the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronauti-
cal and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic) is an international treaty concluded among the 
member states of the Arctic Council—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden 
and the United States—on 12 May 2011 in Nuuk, and Greenland. 
85Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 
(signed 2013). 
86Hathaway, O. A., et al. (2012). The Law of Cyber Attack. Yale School, California Law Review, Paper 
3852, 817-885. 
87Schackelford, S. J. (2014). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law Business, and Relations in 
Search of Cyberspace—An Introduction to the law of Cyber War and Peace. Cambridge University 
Press, 6, 282-283.  
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the EHN area. Even if there are norms of customary law, the current jus ad bel-
lum and jus in bello that are theoretically able to accommodate this new type of 
threats, existing norms leaves uncertainties and gaps that are dangerous to leave 
without the cogent development international law. Despite, the applicability of 
the Budapest Convention, the 2.0 Tallinn Manual and some provisions of 
UNCLOS, and the possible application of space law and IT treaties, there is an 
urgent need to develop a regulatory patchwork of precise instruments mixed 
that can be applicable to protect ECIC in the EHN area. 
The question is which actors would enact new law applicable to ECIC in the 
EHN countries and succeeding in fulfilling in the gaps and imperfections of the 
current existing fragmented framework. International law is inseparable from 
state’s behavior and international organization’s activities. In the context of the 
existing framework applicable under ECIC in the EHN, it is therefore, relevant 
to identify the role of international organizations, as well as non-state actors in 
the applicability of norms. These actors are crucial for decision-makings and for 
providing both hard and soft law instruments that guide state’s behaviors and 
the enforceability of conventions, as well as and for filling international law’s 
gaps and reinforcing mechanisms of collective behavior. 
A notable example, in that sense is the UN with the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) which imposes a spectrum of measures (under Chapters VI and VII of 
the UN Charter) ranging from sanctions to authorizing the use of force against 
violation of international law. The Security Council can decide whether its deci-
sions bind all members or only certain states, even though all countries are ex-
pected to act accordingly with mutual assistance and cooperation. The UNSC re-
lies on regional agencies, states and regional coalitions or military organizations, 
such as NATO in their capacity to enforce its decisions under the Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. In that sense, the Tallinn Manual foresees similar arrangements 
in case of cyber-attacks to critical infrastructures, which also applies in case of 
cyber-attacks under ECIC. NATO has therefore a constructive role to play and 
assisting regional organizations and states in case of cyber-attacks, not only 
among the parties which includes the Arctic States, except Finland and Sweden 
which are not a member of NATO, but also in cooperating with non-member 
states. In particular, NATO today, is cooperating with Russia and China. 
NATO’s aim is thus not to create new laws in general, and in particular laws that 
could be applicable under ECIC conditions in the Arctic, but rather a role of in-
terpretations of the existing norms, which tends to favor only the alliance mem-
bers. Therefore, in order to avoid NATO continuing to exploit imperfections 
and gaps of the existing international law, it is prudent that the UN supervise, 
any NATO’s interpretation of existing laws protecting ECIC in the Arctic. 
Another actor, that should be considered in the case of cyber-attacks to criti-
cal infrastructures in ECIC areas is the Arctic, is Arctic Council (AC). The AC is 
the principal cross-sectorial intergovernmental forum for the Arctic region but 
military security issues are excluded from its activities and mission. Founded in 
1996, the AC keeps predominantly an environmental agenda.  
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Nevertheless, this does not impede that in the future this institution could 
broaden its agenda to include co-operation agreements that include military ac-
tivities, defense and security issues including cyber-security as part of the con-
cept of human security. In the Arctic region there a cyber-security forum able to 
negotiate targeted measures that address common problems, more importantly 
problems related to ECIC, is missing. Such a forum should have a global poten-
tial, not only regional as cyber-threats are transnational and do not know any 
boundaries. Memberships should include also the US and its close NATO and 
non-NATO allies that a share common vision for Internet governance and cy-
ber-security. Hence, cyber-threats should be addressed protecting the security of 
Polar regions through international law and not only political talks. This is a 
pertinent issue to deal with for international law. The parties of the AC could 
manage conflicts and enhance cooperation by dealing with these issues in un-
ison.  
Finally, the EU is another relevant actor in cyber-security protecting norms, 
values, fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law to protect cyberspace. In 
2013, the EU adopted, the Cyber-security Strategy of the European Union, 
adopted jointly by the European Commission and the High Representative. The 
EU refers to cyber-security as an obvious “Digital Single Market”.  
Cybersecurity for the EU forms parts of what is called “Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) forming the basis of the EU external security action. The 
EU has the ambition as a global actor to link internal and external policies, and 
has therefore, enacted, a series of acts of secondary law, which will be examined 
in the next section.  
3.2. Regional Law at the EU Level 
European cyber-security policy is formulated and implemented in a mul-
ti-stakeholder structure where legislation is both private and public and actors 
are interacting with each other. The European cyber security is connected with 
both international developments and domestic implementation sphere.  
ECIC’s cyber-threats in the EHN countries are covered by EU legislation. The 
EU level structure of cyber security also involves the private sector and expe-
riences from private companies. For example, the established European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) seek to reinforce and coordinate ca-
pabilities of the Computer Emergency Response Plans (CERP) conducts regular 
emergency drills and has developed the Information Sharing and Alert System 
(EISAS) to guard against attacks on critical infrastructures. ENISA has also es-
tablished a comprehensive guide to public-private sector cooperation, which is 
called the “Partnership for Resilience” (EP3R) with the aim to improve govern-
ment capabilities through private expertise and thus produce legislation that 
protects private firms from cyber threats.  
The EU level has a rather wide set of regulation, strategies and policies, deal-
ing with cyber security in the context of critical infrastructure. First and fore-
most, there exists the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
S. Cassotta et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/blr.2019.102020 345 Beijing Law Review 
 
tion (EPCIP). The concept of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is a recent 
area of EU interest which was non-existent prior to the 9/2011 attacks. Despite 
the impact of natural disasters on infrastructures was informally discussed in the 
aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsumami.88 Hence, it was only after 9/11 in 
the US, that the concept of Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and its CIP became 
more widely prevalent also in Europe, first via NATO, and soon thereafter also 
within the EU. After the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks, the EU 
debate culminated in the development of the EPCIP and its corresponding act of 
secondary legislation: Directive 2008 on the Identification and Designation of 
European Critical Infrastructures (ECIs).89 Yet, the Council Directive from 2008 
on CIP90 never became a success.  
The 2008 Directive aimed to formulate a common procedure for designating 
CIs in Europe and a common approach to improve resilience. It requests mem-
ber states to identify ECIS, starting from the energy and transport sectors, and 
offer non-binding guidelines for the listing process. 
According to the Directive, that part of CI—and only within two sectors, 
energy and transport—that is defined and designated as European Critical Infra-
structure (ECI), is to be defined and designated by a Member State, and the 
identity of this ECI remains secret. Only a few Member States have chosen to use 
the option to designate categories of CIs as they do not want to be regulated. 
Member states do not want to proceed in designating and defining critical infra-
structures because this would entail not so much to protect CIs but instead put it 
at risk because there would be too much information put into circulation.91 
Thus, most of the Members States have not defined or designated any ECI, be-
cause they do not need to. Even those who have, they have defined and desig-
nated some few close-to-border CI, like power stations or grids that provide ser-
vices across borders.  
According to the Directive, this means that one has to have a preparedness 
plan following a certain EU Commission template. As these ECI are not only 
rather randomly selected or nominated, but also secret to almost anyone, the 
visible effect of the EPCIP is very low. What is left, then, is that the EPCIP pro-
vides member States some kind of financial support to secure national CIs.  
A report of the UK house of Lords argued that the designation of many cate-
gories of sensitive infrastructures as ECI would, because of wide sharing of in-
formation entail not protecting critical infrastructures but actually potentially 
 
 
88Interview conducted by Javier Argomaniz with Council Secretariat official, DG I Civil Protection 
Unit, January 2006, in Argomaniz, J. (2013). The European Union Policies on the Protection of In-
frastructures from Terrorist Attacks: a Critical Assessment. Intelligence and National Security, 
Routledge, 262. 
89For a detailed discussion, see Pursiainen, C. (2009). The Challenges for European Critical Infra-
structure Protection. Journal of European Integration, 31, 6, 721-739. 
90(European) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designa-
tion of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
91Argomaniz, J. (2013). The European Union Policies on the Protection of Infrastructure from Ter-
rorist Attack: A Critical Assessment. Intelligence and National Security. Routledge, Francis and 
Taylor, 264. 
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put it at risk given the possibility to divulgate very sensitive information.92 This 
turn to be a problem as the lack of trust is an additional alibi for the Member 
States. This is also because per definition, a directive, gives considerable room 
for manoeuvre to national governments to avoid complying with their duties 
and obligations, in the case in point, by simply producing a minimal list of des-
ignated ECIs or failing to enact rules on private actors or national authorities 
that have to take measure to implement the Directive. This entails that a key 
principle running through EU actions is the subsidiarity principle and that cy-
ber-security is definitely an area where member states are reluctant to delegate 
legislation to the EU. Nevertheless, CIPs are transnational in nature and have a 
transnational impact of some natural and man-made disasters. There is a tension 
here between the notion of national sovereignty versus trans-border character of 
ECIs and member states are irritated to delegate power to the EU but at the same 
time conscious of the need to enhance cross-border cooperation.  
More indirect but perhaps in the longer term more effective tool has been the 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP). It 
is based on voluntary expert cooperation between the member States, coordi-
nated by the EC. The aim is to contribute to standardization of protection and 
resilience measures within different CI sectors, including cyber threats against 
industrial automated control systems.93 
There exists naturally a rather large body of international information and 
cyber security related standards, most notably the International Organization of 
Standardization (ISO) 27000 family of standards, the latter alone comprising of 
almost 50 standards or their classification94. 
However, the EU has its own normative framework too even if fragmented.95 
In terms of legislation, the most important one is Directive 2016/1148 concern-
ing measures for a high common level of security of network and information 
systems across the Union.96 It regulates information system security of two types 
of entities, namely operators of “essential services” and “digital service provid-
ers”. The former is essentially the same as critical infrastructure operators.  
The term is defined in the directive as an entity that provides a service which 
is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities, the 
provision of which depends on network and information systems, and where an 
incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that service. 
 
 
92UK, House of Lords. (2010) Protecting Europe against Large-scale Cyber-attacks, HL Paper 68, 
London: HSMO. 
93See https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 
94International Organization of Standardization, ISO 27000. Available at: 
http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/. 
95The EU normative framework applicable to cyber security in the Energy Sector is an extremely 
fragmented and incoherent framework which depends on Member States capacity to implement and 
it is first and foremost based on acts of secondary legislation that give freedom to Member States on 
complying with obligations and freedom to the national authorities at local level and it is thus very 
much delegated in the hands of national responsibility. 
96Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concern-
ing measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the 
Union. Official Journal of the European Union, L 194/1, 19.7.2016. 
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The Directive states that the essential services operators should be regulated 
by national legislation taking into account country-specific and sectorial idio-
syncrasies, whereas the digital service providers, which are more of cross-border 
character, are regulated in more harmonised manner by the Directive.  
However, also the essential services operators should respect the minimum 
requirements set by the EU legislation and when the services have a cross-border 
character, the regulation should be agreed with respective countries. The Direc-
tive obliges the Members States to identify both the essential services operators 
and the digital service providers, to establish a national authority for informa-
tion (cyber) security, and it defines the cooperation bodies where the Member 
States harmonize their approaches with each other. 
More important however in the field of cybersecurity is, the previously men-
tioned ENISA. It coordinates cooperation in this field and publishes pre-standards, 
guidelines and fact-based reports on ICT vulnerabilities. As a suitable example 
in our context, one might mention Communication network dependencies for 
ICS/SCADA Systems.97 This rather comprehensive report is essentially a generic 
but still rather detailed risk assessment or risk assessment guideline, with gap 
analysis part and normative recommendations for risk treatment, which gives a 
good ground for the critical infrastructure operators to build their own systems. 
During the last review of EPCIP, it was discussed that Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) should be added to the EPCIP Council Di-
rective along energy and transport. Moreover, the focus of CIP should become 
more cross-sectoral and instead of focusing only on protective measures, one 
should pay more attention to resilience that is not only withstanding threats but 
also recovering from materialized crises rapidly. “From the point of view of 
energy supply, for instance, this would involve the energy, transport, and ICT 
sectors.”98 
However, ICT is included in many other policies of the EU, and most notably 
formulated in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy from 2013. It does not propose any 
supranational model, but emphasizes the need for national legislation, which 
challenge is to overcome the fact that private actors still lack effective incentives 
to provide reliable data on the existence or impact of incidents, to embrace a risk 
management culture or to invest in security solutions. This, it is said, is especial-
ly important in a number of key areas: energy, transport, banking, stock ex-
changes, and enablers of key internet services, as well as public administrations.99 
Last year, in February 2017, the Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform 
EECSP—Expert Group, has issued an important report100 to provide guidance to 
 
 
97European Union Agency for Network and Information Security—ENISA. (2017). Communication 
network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems. Available at: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies. 
98European Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the EPCIP, Brussels, 22.6.2012. 
SWD (2012). 190 final, 8. 
99EU Cybersecurity Strategy (2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN 
(2013), 1 final, 12.  
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the EU Commission on policy and regulatory directions at European level ad-
dressing the energy sector key points including infrastructural issues, security of 
supply, smart grids technologies and nuclear. According to this report, under the 
lead of DG Energy, the EU Commission is preparing, a strategy on cyber securi-
ty for the whole energy sector to reinforce and complement the implementation 
of the NIS Directive and also to foster synergies between the Energy Union and 
the Digital Single Market agenda. A common approach to address cyber threats 
across Europe, building on the existing Cyber Security Strategy at the EU 
launched in 2013, is still missing.  
In particular, the EECSP—Expert group has identified 39 gaps not covered by 
existing legislations. Most importantly the absence of a formalized and effective 
threat and risk management system, especially concerning how to identify oper-
ators of essential services for the energy sector at EU level101 has been acknowl-
edged. In this regards a harmonization criteria for the identification of operators 
of essential services is not available nor is as a consistent set of commonly ac-
cepted criteria for the identification of the energy essential operators which is 
missing.102 
In addition, another relevant existing gap, needs to be filled in order to im-
prove cyber resilience in the energy sector103 and the willingness of different 
stakeholders to cooperate and collaborate in this effort especially when they op-
erates in cross-border interconnected energy network in order to manage the 
“cascading effect”104 across regions. The electricity grid and gas transport pipe-
lines are strongly interconnected across Europe. The cascading effect could be 
serious, as demonstrated in a major European blackout in 2006.105 
Another gap to be filled at EU level is the handling and governance of crisis 
management. Crisis management depends strongly on communication capabili-
ties for example between operators and governmental authorities. In particular, 
a successful handling of crises depends on ensuring a clear and well-functioning 
description of roles and responsibilities as well as insuring that communications 
between roles and responsibilities parties is working well.  
Other relevant gaps identified in the report concerns information sharing on 
threats, risk and vulnerabilities that are not well defined and designed and lack-
 
 
100Report, Cyber Security in the Energy Sector – Recommendations for the European Commission 
on a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future—Legislative Acts for the Energy Sec-
tor-Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform, (2017) 1-71. 
101Report Cyber Security in the Energy Sector—Recommendations for the European Commission on 
a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future—Legislative Acts for the Energy Sector.  
Energy Expert Cyber Security, Platform, 2017, page 9. 
102Report, Cyber Security in the Energy Sector—Recommendations for the European Commission 
on a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future—Legislative Acts for the Energy Sector.  
Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform, (2017). 53. 
103Report, Cyber Security in the Energy Sector—Recommendations for the European Commission 
on a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future—Legislative Acts for the Energy Sector. 
Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform, (2017), 10-11. 
104For an understanding of the concept of “cascading effect to CIs”, see section 1 (introduction) of 
the present article. 
105See the European blackout. (2006). At https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006 European_blackout. 
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ing from a common applicable classification scheme. 
This means that the EU lacks a clear cyber response framework including 1) 
classification of attacks 2) definition of responsibilities and capabilities needed to 
respond adequately on different level of cyber-attacks, 3) cooperation and in-
formation sharing between the attacked organization, Member States, Nations 
States, EU, OSCE, NATO and international alliances.106 
There is still pending work in designating and defining infrastructures that are 
critical and define under which set of circumstances is a challenging step because 
there is no absolute definition but only vary degrees of criticality which can even 
change due to technologic development. 
3.3. Domestic Law and Policy with Norway 
In the Norwegian national context, there is a growing body of regulative acts, 
strategies, guidelines, action plans and respective policies aiming at securing 
critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks., Mostly official documents speak 
about information security rather that cyber security, and the scope is therefore 
wider than merely preparing for cyber security attacks. 
3.3.1. Law and Regulations 
The so-called Security Law on preventive security measures from 1998 (lastly 
amended in 2016)107 defines the responsibilities and rights of the Norwegian Na-
tional Security Authority (NSM), established only in 2003, which is a 
cross-sectoral professional and supervisory authority within the protective secu-
rity services in Norway, especially focusing on information security. According 
to the mandate, the purpose of protective security is to counter threats to the in-
dependence and security of the realm and other vital national security interests, 
primarily espionage, sabotage or acts of terrorism. The law also discusses infor-
mation security in one article, Article 4 with several paragraphs. It defines the 
security grades for different type of information, the responsibility to secure the 
sensitive information, the authority control over the sensitive information man-
agement, including the equipment and encryption systems, monitoring the se-
curity, including the right, with consent of the function owner, for the NSM to 
hack the information systems in order to find vulnerabilities. The law was de-
tailed in the Regulation on Information Security from 2001108, including the ba-
sic security principles, management system, technical minimum requirements, 
and so forth. 
As to the energy field in particular, the so-called preparedness regulation 
concerning power production from 2012 contains an article which is Article 6 
on information security. It includes sections on identification of sensitive infor-
 
 
106Report, Cyber Security in the Energy Sector—Recommendations for the European Commission 
on a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future—Legislative Acts for the Energy Sec-
tor-Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform, 2017, 52. 
107Lov om forebyggende sikkerhetstjeneste (sikkerhetsloven), LOV-1998-03-20-10, Sist endret 
LOV-2016-08-12-78 f, Forsvarsdepartementet 1998/2016. 
108Forskrift om informasjonssikkerhet (av 1. juli 2001 nr. 744).  
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mation, which refers to information that might damage installations or affect 
features that affect the power supply, such as vulnerabilities and location of 
critical equipment. It does not include any explicit regulation concerning a cy-
ber-attack, rather that one receive sensitive information that can be used for 
other type of malicious attacks. 
In that sense the Norwegian model has strong potential to be used as a source 
of inspiration in the design of a future information sharing scheme on threats, 
risk and vulnerabilities for the EU level. Presently, the EU regulatory level such a 
scheme is not defined and designed. The EU regulatory level is also lacking a 
common applicable classification scheme as explained in the previous section. 
3.3.2. Strategies and Actions Plans 
Norway’s governments third and latest “National strategy for information secu-
rity’ is from 2012 (preceded by and based on the first and second strategies of 
2003-2006 and 2007-2010 respectively as well as the proposal for “Cyber security 
strategy).”109 The 2012 strategy starts with the statement that ICT is a 
cross-sectoral “strategic security challenge” that “has become critical for the so-
ciety to work normally”, thus embedding critical or vital societal functions and 
respective infrastructure as well as their interactions.  
While the overall coordination role is with the government, the strategy de-
fines a hierarchy of the variety of actors and their respective roles and responsi-
bilities. First, each function bears the main responsibility, following the Norwe-
gian so-called responsibility principle explaining that the actor who has respon-
sibility in normal conditions should also bear responsibility in a crisis situation. 
“In practice, this means that the responsibility lies with the owner of a function, 
no matter it is located in the public or private sector.” Larger security measures 
however are prepared in cooperation of the owner of a function and respective 
public agencies. The specific ministries or departments are all responsible for 
their sector’s critical infrastructure security, in terms of identifying the critical 
functions and infrastructures, as well as evaluating, planning on the strategic 
level, the prevention, preparedness and response measures, as well as monitoring 
cyber security in the agencies that are subordinated to them. In practice, these 
agencies are responsible for the respective actions as they know their functions 
the best. Four ministries, namely the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness, the 
Ministry of Government Administration, the Ministry of Defense, and the Min-
istry of Transport and Communications, are singled out as particularly being 
responsible for cyber security.  
The strategy then outlines on generic level, the actions that should be taken. 
They include: developing a holistic and systematic approach towards cyber secu-
rity; making the cyber security dimensions related to vital societal functions 
more robust; coordinating the cyber security measures in the public administra-
tion; developing the warning and response systems towards cyber threats; en-
 
 
109Nasjonal strategi for informasjonssikkerhet, Fornyings-, administrasjons-, og kirkedepartetement 
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hancing the prevention measures; putting continuously resources to competence 
and capability building; and securing high-level national research related to cy-
ber security.  
The strategy was accompanied some years later with an Action Plan on In-
formation Security 2015-2017110, which however covers only public administra-
tion. Information Security and related crisis management should be organized in 
the same way as Norway’s general crisis management system, based on four 
principles. First, the responsibility principle implies that the agency who is in 
charge of a sector or issue in normal situation, is also responsible for handling 
extraordinary events. Second, equality principle means that the normal daily or-
ganization structure should be kept as much as possible similar also in extraor-
dinary events. Third, the subsidiarity principle tells that extraordinary events 
should be handled at a lowest level possible. Finally, the cooperation principle 
requires that each authority, function or agency has to take its own responsibility 
to organize the best possible cooperation with all relevant actors in prevention, 
preparedness and response to extraordinary events. The Action Plan then de-
fines basic tasks related to six areas: management and control; risk management; 
security in digital services; digital preparedness; national common components 
(instead of each sector building its own security systems); and knowledge, com-
petence and culture. 
In the substance all these elements of the Norwegian model, based on the four 
principles of the crisis management system contained in the Norwegian Action 
Plan on Information Security, are well suited to be taken into consideration as a 
source of inspiration to fill the EU regulatory gaps on crisis management system, 
exposed in the previous section. 
3.3.3. Critical Infrastructure and Vital Societal Functions 
Like its Nordic neighbours, Norway also chose to speak about critical or vital so-
cietal functions rather than just critical infrastructure. Already in the early Nor-
wegian approach from 2006—called “Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Critical Societal Functions in Norway”111—both the concept of infrastructure 
and that of function were included as elements at different levels. Critical societ-
al functions formed a more general level, being dependent on but also encom-
passing infrastructures. The hierarchical idea was that society’s basic needs are 
covered by critical societal functions, which depend on infrastructures, whose 
criticality is assessed according to three criteria: 1) dependability, in that a high 
degree of dependability implies criticality; 2) alternatives, in that few or no al-
ternatives imply criticality; and 3) tight coupling, in that a high degree of tight 
 
 
110Kommunal-og moderniseringsdepartement, “Handlingsplan for informasjonssikkerhet i 
statsforvaltningen 2015-2017”, Norway, Oslo (2015). 
111Justis-og politidepartementet, Når sikkerheten er viktigst. Beskyttelse av landets kritiske 
infrastrukturer og kritiske samfunnsfunksjoner. Innstilling fra utvalgoppnevnt ved kongelig 
resolusjon 29. oktober 2004, Avgitt til Justis-og politidepartementet 5. april 2006, NOU Norges 
offentlige utredninger 2006: 6. Departementenes services enter Informasjonsforvaltning, Norway, 
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coupling or linkage within a network implies criticality. This approach forms the 
basis for deciding whether any given infrastructure is critical or not. In practice, 
the approach makes it possible to limit the extent of the CI considerably, because 
not every part of, say, an electricity grid or a transport system is necessarily con-
sidered critical, which is the case in the EU approach at the conceptual level. 
Therefore, this important idea contained in the Norwegian approach turn to be 
extremely inspiring for the EU in order to fill the gap of the total absence of criti-
cality in the notion of “critical infrastructure” as explained in the previous section. 
In a 2017 report by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), 
titled “Vital functions in society, it was discussed which kind of functional capa-
bilities must society maintain at all times.112 The term “vital societal functions” is 
defined and the functions are listed and categorized. The term is reserved for 
“functions that society could not cope without for seven days or less without this 
threatening the safety and/or security of the population”. The term is further di-
vided into three broad categories: governability and sovereignty; security of the 
population; and societal functionality. Listed under these categories are the func-
tional areas and assets that are usually brought up in critical infrastructure dis-
cussions, such as the government and other administrative bodies, the emergen-
cy services, essential utilities such as energy and water, and so forth. It is note-
worthy that the very term “critical infrastructure” is not mentioned at all, with 
the term “infrastructure-based services” being used instead. In the report, cyber 
(or ICT) security is a horizontal concept, but there is a short section about it in 
particular. It is mentioned that it is important to have the ability “to detect in-
formation security incidents, limit damage and rapidly restore normal operation 
in registers and systems with vital societal functions and/or which include con-
fidential personal data”, and that it “is essential for every system owner to be ca-
pable of detecting unwanted incidents as soon as possible in order to limit dam-
age and restore system functionality and security”. 
3.3.4. Risk Assessments 
The most recent “National Risk Assessment” was prepared by the Norwegian 
Directorate of Civil Protection in 2014.113 It emphasizes that attacks against 
SCADA systems may paralyses or destroy power production, power transmis-
sion, refineries, water supply, treatment plants, transport and oil platforms, as 
well as reveals a lot of sensitive and classified information for unauthorized par-
ties. The Risk Assessment refers to plans and materialized threats specially de-
signed to take control of SCADA systems in Norway, related to espionage, sabo-
tage and terror. The bottlenecks include the enterprises policies, not taking the 
risks seriously enough, not having the needed security organization at place, and 
relying on outdated security technology, and all in all not introducing the proper 
risk-reducing measures. The National Risk Assessment discusses particularly 
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two malicious attack scenarios under the concept of “cyber space”. These are 
Cyber Attack on Financial Infrastructure and Cyber Attack on Electronic Com-
munications Infrastructure. These scenarios are discussed in rather detailed way 
on the axis of likelihood, on the one hand, and consequences, on the other hand. 
In the first scenario, the likelihood is estimated as “low” while the average con-
sequences would be “large”, the second worst score. When it comes to specially 
the consequence sub-group of “societal stability”, including social unrest and ef-
fects on daily life of the population, the consequences would be “very large. As to 
the second scenario, the treatment differentiates risks similarly within different 
consequence fields, such as power, roads, air, sea, civil protection and so forth.  
When it comes to power, the risk is considered lower than in many other 
fields due “the power plants” own closed process and communications net-
work”, however, while there would follow “delayed repair of local outages due to 
external communication problems with customers and suppliers”. The overall 
assessment is again estimated as “low” in terms of the likelihood and “large” in 
terms of consequences, however, the latter scoring most dramatic in the fields of 
economic losses and social stability. The Government’s official report on Digital 
vulnerability from 2015114 adds to this analysis. This is a rather detailed report of 
over 300 pages, covering most issues discussed above. When it comes to securing 
critical infrastructure, the report discusses this under the subissue of “robustness 
of infrastructure”, where the answer to the threat is basically redundancy of the 
vital infrastructure services and their distribution routes. When it comes to 
power production and distribution, the report follows the DSB evaluation and 
considers that the risk from the electronic communication sector to power sector 
is rather low due to the closed and redundant networks that this sector utilizes.  
National Security Authority (NSM) in turn published in 2016 its second Ho-
listic Risk Picture115, focusing on information and communication technology. 
This document classifies the threats and vulnerabilities, and builds a risk picture 
on that basis, and then proposes the needed counter actions. The report however 
is very generic in spirit, more typological than data-analysis based risk assess-
ment. As to critical societal functions and infrastructure, one can find the fol-
lowing statement about the source of threat: “Attack against societal functions 
seem to be linked to potential conflict situations with foreign states.”116 
3.3.5. The Norwegian Arctic and Cyber-Threats 
Moving to the Arctic conditions, most of the threat pictures in the national risk 
assessments are valid. However, some specific issues might make the critical in-
frastructure in the Arctic area more vulnerable, most notably the long distances 
and in some places harsh winter conditions. Let us use Svalbard as an example. 
Svalbard is a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean situated about midway 
between continental Norway and the North Pole, with a population not more 
 
 
114Departementenessikkerhets-og serviceorganisasjon, Digital sårbarhet sikkert samfunn. Beskytte 
enkeltmennesker og samfunn i endigitalisert verden, NOU (2015),1, Norway, Oslo. 
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than under 3 000. Most of them live in the town Long year by en. 
Following the regulations for local actors in Norway, also Svalbard prepares 
regularly risk assessment, the latest being from 2013.117 It includes a section for 
critical infrastructure and vital societal functions, including treatments for en-
ergy, heating, drinking water, tele communication and data, as well as food sup-
ply.  
Of these, tele communication and data, comprising basically of cable network 
in Svalbard and the undersea communication cable to the mainland, is left off 
the official, published report as including too vulnerable information. 
The energy supply of Longyearbyen is dependent on the town’s power plant, 
which in turn is dependent on the coal supply from the local mining facility. If 
the coal storage is emptied, diesel generators can be used as a reserve, but sooner 
or later the fuel is also ending without further supply. While in the risk assess-
ment the likelihood of the worst case, total disruption of energy supply, is con-
sidered low, the consequences are considered as severe. Depending on the time 
of the year, the population would have to be evacuated to the mainland, and also 
the other infrastructure would be damaged without electricity and related heat-
ing. Some diesel aggregates in critical places such as the airport could however 
provide some time. When it comes to central heating, the most serious vulner-
ability is if the primary network would be damaged or its function would be dis-
rupted; as a result, in most harsh winter times (even if in Svalbard the tempera-
ture rarely goes lower than about −15 Celsius in winter time), the town would be 
frozen and its infrastructure would be damaged. Electricity disruption in winter-
time would also sooner or later result in the damage and disruption of the 
drinking water network. As to the food supply, the main food shop chain has a 
reserve for four months for most needed products, though some would be vul-
nerable to electricity disruption.  
In general, the overall strategy of Svalbard is to identify the bottlenecks and 
find and enhance redundant systems to overcome natural, technological and 
man-made threats. While cyber security is not specifically discussed in the pub-
lished report, it is however easy to imagine that some parts of the interdependent 
infrastructure chain, most notably related to electricity production and distribu-
tion, might be vulnerable for cyber-attacks. 
To sum up, the analysis of the legal and policy framework applicable to cy-
ber-threats and cyber-attacks in a pluralistic and polycentric approach and in a 
multilevel regulatory analysis denotes the existence of a complex cybersecurity re-
gime that is not yet a consolidated regime. However, from all that proceed, it can 
be advocated that the cybersecurity regime including the case of cyber-threats and 
cyber-attacks to CIs in the EHN under ECIC conditions is in the process to be 
created and this section has helped to establish how to design a framework to 
cyber-threats and cyber-attacks by combining different levels of governance with 
particular emphasis on the role of Norway as a crucial source of inspiration. 
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4. Conclusion, Recommendations and New Future Pathways 
This article has demonstrated how CIs, cyber security and human security are 
intertwined and how this inter-linkage ends up being highly risky in terms of 
management in the EHN within a global multi-level context. This high level of 
exceptional criticality in terms of vulnerability is due the fact that in the presence 
of harsh climatic conditions as a consequence of climate change effects, CIs be-
came “extra critical” from which derived the new concept coined as “Exception-
ally Critical Infrastructure Conditions” (ECIC).  
4.1. Conclusion 
From a legal and political point of view, the interlinkage between CIs and cyber 
security under ECIC conditions needs special protection, in terms of resilience, 
management of risks and cooperation between European High North countries 
(EHN), which share similar problems and threats. The need to defend these CIs 
under attack from foreign nations, or some individual or some groups of people 
will arise. Most of relevant norms come from pre-cyber international law before 
cyber-threats appeared and constitute fundamental principles, such as the pro-
hibition of intervention, use of force, attacks on civilian targets. A holistic as-
sessment under the prism of human security focusing on risk assessment and 
management has been achieved with the aim to understand, and to improve co-
herency and uniformity of international and regional law. In addressing the 
question of research, this article has demonstrated that the law cannot solve or 
represent the only part of the possible puzzle to be applicable in case of cyber 
threats to CIs, in the EHN under ECIC conditions. Instrument mixes, such as 
standards, strategies, measures, tools, voluntary measures, codes as identified at 
global, regional and national regulatory levels, are also necessary.  
4.2. Recommendations 
They need to be integrated with collateral governance issues, such as environ-
mental threats, international relations, international cooperation and coordina-
tion, the factor of human security, private and public approach. These collateral 
governance issues, including standards all operate in syntonic synergistic lin-
kage, including the stake-holder approaches. Practitioners, policy makers and 
governments may be well aware that cyber threats applied to CIs under ECIC 
conditions cannot be covered by existing international, regional or national laws 
because unfitting or they do not address the event. However, this does not mean 
that there is a void of legislations. On the contrary, this article has assessed and 
analyzed the possibilities also in terms of cooperation. Some states or interna-
tional organizations have even gone beyond cooperation by adopting interna-
tional norms. An example of such a phenomena is the EU law, with the directive 
2008/114/EC.118 However, there is no such readily applicable framework, but a 
myriad of potential international law norms, coupled by the guidance produced 
by the valid updated analysis of the new version of the 2.0 Tallinn Manual. Still, 
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it is not clear how international law applies. The need for a regulatory frame-
work applicable to CIs and cyber-security is evident. Designing a suitable pro-
gramme linked to human security is urgent. This article suggests designing a 
possible framework by combing the potential of bits of provisions from interna-
tional-regional and domestic levels of sources of law and policy, combined with 
relevant sources of Norwegian law and policy strategy under the human security 
umbrella. By validating the first assumption of this article,119 it has been ex-
plained and proven why Norway has been selected as a case study, especially for 
its value on how this model could contribute both the international and regional 
law in designing an effective legal framework. Cyber-threats present a new kind 
of threat and gaps in regulatory terms that current international and regional 
laws are not ready to meet. The Norwegian model presents several potential as-
pects that could begin to fill gaps. For example, the Norwegian model has strong 
potential to be used as a source of inspiration to design future information shar-
ing schemes on threats, risk and vulnerability that are not well defined at the EU 
level. By validating the second assumption of this article120, it has been demon-
strated how the four principles of crisis management are well suited to be incor-
porated in a new possible piece of international agreements in the EHN. 
4.3. New Future Pathways 
New future pathways suggests that combination of both the policy and legal 
framework can give birth to a new embryonic agreement the skeleton framework 
of which would empower EHN to cooperate and collaborate further. Such a new 
regulatory framework or new agreement should require that parties pass domes-
tic laws prohibiting cyber-attacks and harmonize laws across states. Such kinds 
of agreement should be based on information sharing, aspects of international, 
EU and Norwegian sources of laws and policies setting up additional mechan-
isms to include cooperation and collaboration with a human security global di-
mension. 
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